Varieties of social cognition by Eric Luis Uhlmann et al.
 
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 
 
38:3
0021–8308
 
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008. Published by Blackwell
Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd Oxford, UK JTSB Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 0021-8308 1468-5914 © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008 XXX Original Articles
 
Unconscious Social Cognition Eric Luis Uhlmann
 
 et al.
 
Varieties of Social Cognition
 
ERIC LUIS UHLMANN, DAVID A. PIZARRO AND 
PAUL BLOOM
 
ABSTRACT Recent work within psychology demonstrates that unconscious cognition plays a central role in the judgments and actions of individuals. We distinguish between two basic types unconscious social cognition: unconsciousness of the 
 
inﬂuences
 
 on judgments and actions, and unconscious of the mental 
 
states
 
 (i.e., attitudes and feelings) that give rise to judgments and actions. Inﬂuence unconsciousness is corroborated by strong empirical evidence, but unconscious states are difﬁcult to verify. We discuss procedures aimed at providing conclusive evidence of state unconsciousness, and apply them to recent empirical ﬁndings. KEYWORDS:  implicit social cognition, unconscious cognition, implicit measures, priming, automaticity, consciousness
 
After reading words related to stereotypes of the elderly, such as “Florida” and
“wrinkle,” people tend to walk more slowly (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996).
Being subliminally exposed to pictures of African American males makes people
hostile, and thinking about professors improves their performance at Trivial Pursuit
(Bargh et al., 1996; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998). People are more
likely to mistakenly judge a male to be famous, and an African American to be a
criminal (Banaji & Bhaskar, 2000; Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Payne, 2001).
Based on these and other similarly dramatic ﬁndings, we and many other
psychologists have come to agree with Bargh and Chartrand (1999), who proposed
that: “. . . most of a person’s everyday life is determined not by their conscious
intentions and deliberate choices but by mental processes that are put into motion
by features of the environment and that operate outside of conscious awareness
and guidance” (p. 462; see also Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001).
The present article addresses the criteria used to determine the consciousness
and unconsciousness of mental processes, speciﬁcally those central to social cognition.
We use the term unconscious to mean “currently inaccessible to conscious intro-
spection.” This is similar to the deﬁnition of unconsciousness offered by Baars
(1997, p. 187), speciﬁcally that which is “largely inaccessible at any given time.”
Our deﬁnition is also close to Armstrong’s (1980) notion of introspective uncon-
sciousness, which he views as the most important form of unconsciousness and
the one closest to commonsense notions of what it means to be unconscious.
Operationally, this means that the person is unable to accurately report the
relevant mental phenomenon when asked.
There are, however, two importantly different types of unconscious social
cognition: (i) unconsciousness of the 
 
inﬂuences 
 
on judgment and behavior and (ii)
unconsciousness of the 
 
mental states
 
 (i.e., attitudes and feelings) that give rise to such
judgments and behaviors. An unconscious inﬂuence occurs when an individual is
unaware that a stimulus in the environment has led to changes in her feelings,
attitudes, judgments or actions. For instance, she may be unaware that the order
in which she viewed a series of nightgowns inﬂuenced which one she decided to
buy (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), of the role played by location in her choice of 
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colleges (Wilson & Stone, 1985), that an interaction partner’s subtle chin-
rubbing has led her to rub her own chin (unconscious mimicry; Chartrand
& Bargh, 1999), of the factors that inﬂuenced her to like one painting more
than another (Wilson & LaFleur, 1995), or that exposure to words related to
recklessness has led her to perceive a man as reckless (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones,
1977).
This is to be distinguished from an unconscious 
 
state
 
. This exists when the
person is unaware of the feeling or attitude that gave rise to her judgment or
action. For instance, an individual may be unaware that she is suddenly feeling
especially committed to the goal of behaving cooperatively or that she has
negative automatic attitudes towards Black people. As these examples illustrate,
the state in question could be either temporary (e.g., a ﬂeeting commitment to
cooperativeness temporarily primed by the environment) or stable (e.g., a person’s
longstanding attitude towards members of a social group). Notably, state
unconsciousness implies inﬂuence unconsciousness because it is impossible to be
aware of inﬂuences on a state if you are not aware of the state itself. As such,
state unconsciousness can be considered a deeper or more profound form of
unconsciousness.
The distinction between unconscious inﬂuences and unconscious states is an
intuitive one, and relevant to multiple areas of psychology and related ﬁelds.
Consider the effects of violent media on aggressive behavior, which are of interest not
only to social psychologists (Anderson & Bushman, 2002), but also developmental
psychologists (Huesmann, Eron, Lefkowitz, & Walder, 1973), clinical psychologists
(Singer & Singer, 1983), and sociologists (Phillips, 1979, 1983). Unconsciousness
of the effects of violent media may take different forms. An individual may be
unaware that he is behaving aggressively due to watching a violent television
program (inﬂuence unconsciousness) or he can be unaware that he is feeling
aggressive at all (unconsciousness of the mediating state).
This distinction between unconscious inﬂuences and unconscious states is not
intended to be an exhaustive categorization of unconscious cognitive phenomena.
There also exists unconscious perception (Holender, 1986; Reingold & Merikle,
1988, 1990), unconscious learning (Reber, 1989), unconscious memory ( Jacoby,
1991; Roediger, 1990; Schacter, 1992), and even unconscious behavior (Armstrong,
1980; Kihlstrom, Mulvaney, Tobias, & Tobis, 2000). However, unconscious inﬂuences
and states have deservedly received special attention from researchers due to their
profound implications for social judgment and behavior, among these unconscious
aspects of consumer choices (Brunel, Tietje, & Greenwald, 2004), managerial
behavior (Chugh, 2004; Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, & Ross, 2004), anxiety and shyness
(Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002), cooperation
(Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001), self-esteem (Greenwald
& Banaji, 1995), health-related behaviors (Czopp, Monteith, Zimmerman, &
Lynam, 2004; Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, & Chassin, 2003), social afﬁliation
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), career choices (Rudman & Heppen, 2003), sexual 
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harassment (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995), intellectual performance
(Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998), moral judgments (Haidt, 2001), phobias
(Teachman & Woody, 2003), and suicide (Phillips, 1979). At the same time,
there has been relatively little formal discussion of the criteria used to conclude
unconsciousness of inﬂuences and states. The present article is an effort to address
this signiﬁcant gap in the literature.
We will argue here that while there is conclusive evidence that people are often
unconscious of the inﬂuences on their judgments and behaviors, unconscious
mental states are much more difﬁcult to verify empirically. One reason for this is
that in contemporary research on unconsciousness of mental states, such as the
unobtrusive priming of behavior and the implicit measurement of attitudes,
unconsciousness is typically the null hypothesis (i.e., that evidence of awareness
will 
 
not
 
 emerge). Because it is difﬁcult to conﬁrm the null hypothesis, it is also
difﬁcult to conclusively demonstrate state unconsciousness. In an effort to further
research on this topic, we propose criteria for assessing the unconsciousness of
mental states, and apply them to recent empirical ﬁndings.
It is important to emphasize that our goal is to identify 
 
conservative 
 
criteria for
verifying unconscious inﬂuences and states. All of the evidence of unconscious
social cognition reviewed here—including experimental designs that equate
unconsciousness with the null—provides meaningful evidence that people
frequently lack introspective access into their mental processes. In many if not
most cases, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that the preponderance of the
evidence points to unconscious inﬂuences and states. Notably, researchers often
refer to inﬂuences and states that are strong candidates for unconscious social
cognition as “automatic,” “nonconscious,” and “implicit,” perhaps in part to
avoid making overly strong claims about consciousness vs. unconsciousness (e.g.,
Bargh et al., 1996, 2001; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). However, more conservative
criteria are required in order to conclusively demonstrate unconscious social
cognition.
 
EVIDENCE FOR INFLUENCE UNCONSCIOUSNESS
 
The evidence that people are often unconscious of the inﬂuences on their judgments
and behaviors comes from ﬁve primary sources: debrieﬁngs of experimental
participants, subliminal priming studies, comparisons of the judgments of actors
and observers, the effects of asking individuals to analyze the reasons for their
attitudes, and studies that manipulate participants’ awareness of potential
inﬂuences on their judgments. In part because they equate unconsciousness with
the null hypothesis, debrieﬁngs and subliminal priming studies provide signiﬁcant
but not conclusive evidence of unconscious inﬂuences. In contrast, actor-observer
comparisons, reasons analyses, and experimental manipulations of awareness
provide conclusive evidence. 
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1. Participant Debrieﬁngs
A classic review by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) questioned the common assumption
that we have introspective access into the inﬂuences on our judgments. For
example, they noted that participants’ preferences for different nightgowns are
demonstrably inﬂuenced by the order in which the nightgowns are presented, that
their opinions on school busing change in response to persuasive messages, that
their evaluations of a teacher’s attributes (his appearance, accent, and mannerisms)
are affected by the warmth or coldness of his personality, and that subtle hints
from the experimenter improve their performance on logic problems. Yet when
subsequently asked to report the factors that inﬂuenced their judgment, participants
are unable to accurately assess the inﬂuence of these experimenter-induced factors.
Rather, they believe that they chose the most objectively appealing product, that
their opinions were unchanged from the week before, that their evaluations of the
teacher were caused by their evaluations of his attributes (when the reverse was
actually the case), and that they solved the logic problem by virtue of their own
inspired intellect. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) concluded that we lack genuine
introspective access into our mental processes, and instead use shared cultural
theories to construct 
 
post-hoc
 
 explanations for our judgments—and mistake them
for conscious awareness of the causes of our behavior.
While they provide important evidence of unconscious inﬂuences, participant
debrieﬁngs have some shortcomings. First, they can make it difﬁcult to distinguish
between unconsciousness and forgetfulness. A person who was only momentarily
aware that she was being inﬂuenced by a stimulus may appear, as far as the experi-
menter conducting the debrieﬁng is concerned, to have never had any such awareness.
A second issue is that debrieﬁngs rely on a null effect to demonstrate a lack of
consciousness awareness. Taking the null hypothesis as evidence for unconscious
processes is less than ideal because null effects can occur for any number of
reasons, many of them methodological. In the case of debrieﬁngs, there is always
the possibility that better questions, a different demeanor on the part of the
experimenter, or some other change in the experimental situation would produce
evidence of conscious awareness. Participant debrieﬁngs therefore provide
signiﬁcant but not conclusive evidence of unconscious inﬂuences.
2. Subliminal Priming Studies
Also supportive of inﬂuence unconsciousness are studies in which subliminally
presented stimuli inﬂuence judgments and behaviors (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996;
Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). For example, Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) had
participants complete an ostensive vigilance task. During the task, words related
to hostility were ﬂashed for a fraction of a second. The primes were further
masked using a string of Xs that appeared immediately afterward. Participants so 
Unconscious Social Cognition
 
297
 
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008
 
primed subsequently perceived an ambiguously described target person as hostile.
An additional condition demonstrated that participants were unable to guess what
the masked prime words were. Such studies provide important evidence for
inﬂuence unconsciousnes. After all, if participants never consciously perceived the
primes, they could not possibly have been aware of their inﬂuence.
However, whether the procedures used in such studies actually rule out conscious
perception of the primes is somewhat controversial (see Draine & Greenwald,
1998; Holender, 1986, and the commentaries following both articles). The debate
largely boils down to whether subjective or objective thresholds should be used to
assess conscious perception (Reingold & Merikle, 1988, 1990). A subjective threshold
relies on participants’ self-reports of the conscious perceptibility of the prime (as
in Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). In contrast, an objective threshold uses participants’
performance on another task, rather than their self-reports, as the measure of aware-
ness. For example, to determine whether participants could consciously perceive
the valence of their subliminal primes, Draine and Greenwald (1998) administered
a second task requiring them to consciously categorize the brieﬂy ﬂashed words as
positive or negative by pressing one of two computer keys. Performance at chance levels
was taken as evidence that there was no conscious perception of the primes. If one
accepts a subjective threshold for determining unconscious perception, studies like
Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) prove unconsciousness of inﬂuence. But if one favors
a conservative objective threshold, they do not (Draine and Greenwald, 1998).
Proponents of objective thresholds (e.g., Draine & Greenwald, 1998) argue that
subjective thresholds are too lax since participants could be somewhat aware of
the primes, but not enough to provide perfectly accurate reports. They further
note that researchers sometimes ask participants the wrong question, such as
reporting the speciﬁc word rather than inquiring about the critical feature of the
prime (such as whether it was a positive word or a negative word). Proponents of
a subjective threshold (ourselves included) argue that above-chance performance on
objective tasks need not reﬂect conscious awareness. Quick motor responses on an
awareness task as to whether a brieﬂy ﬂashed word is good or bad might be correct
due to unconscious processing of its meaning. That is, when participants are obliged
to respond quickly, their key presses might be inﬂuenced by unconscious perceptions
of the stimuli rather than conscious choices. Due to this unresolved controversy over
whether objective (i.e., performance-based) or subjective (i.e., self-report based)
thresholds are more appropriate, a conclusive case for inﬂuence unconsciousness
cannot be made solely based on subliminal priming studies using a subjective threshold.
3. Comparisons of Actors and Observers
A particularly convincing source of evidence for inﬂuence unconsciousness is
the comparison of actors’ assessments of the inﬂuences on their judgments with
the assessments of observers (Nisbett & Bellows, 1977; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
298
 
Eric Luis Uhlmann et al.
 
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008
 
Wilson & Brekke, 1994). In these studies, one set of participants (actors) formulates
a judgment (for example, of the deceptiveness of interviewees; Kraut & Lewis, 1982)
and assesses the role of various potential inﬂuences on their judgment (e.g., the role
of eye contact in their judgments of deceptiveness). Other participants (observers)
are merely given a description of the judgmental situation and asked to predict either
how a speciﬁc actor (Wright & Rip, 1981), the average actor (Wilson, Laser, & Stone,
1982), or they themselves (Kraut & Lewis, 1982) would formulate their judgments.
Within-subject correlations are calculated between actual and perceived inﬂuences
for both actors and observers, and their relative accuracy is compared. Remarkably,
actors are not more accurate at estimating the inﬂuences on their own judgments
than are observers (see Wilson & Stone, 1985, for a review). This suggests that
rather than introspecting, they rely on cultural theories of inﬂuence that they
share with observers (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson & Stone, 1985).
Actor-observer comparisons technically rely on null effects, in the form of no
difference between the accuracy of actors and observers. However, since both
actors and observers show signiﬁcant correspondence between estimated and
actual inﬂuences (e.g., highly signiﬁcant within-subject correlations; Wilson &
Stone, 1985), such null ﬁndings are attributable to the accuracy of observers
rather than measurement problems.
4. The Effects of Asking Individuals to Analyze the Reasons for Their Attitudes
Additional evidence for inﬂuence unconsciousness that does not rely on equating
unconsciousness with the null can be found in studies that ask people to reﬂect
on the reasons for their evaluations of attitude objects. The attitude objects can
range from beverages and vacation pictures to academic courses, political candidates
and even signiﬁcant others. Individuals who are asked to analyze the reasons for
their attitudes tend to change their original attitudes, are less satisﬁed with the
choices they make based on those attitudes, show weaker correspondence between
their attitudes and their behaviors, and are less able to predict their future
behaviors—all of which suggests that they are unaware of the true causes of their
attitudes (Wilson & LaFleur, 1995; Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson, Dunn, Bybee,
Hyman, & Rotondo, 1984; Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989). In other words,
if attitudes are signiﬁcantly changed when individuals are asked to consciously
report the reasons for their attitudes, then these original attitudes were most likely
not the product of those conscious reasons.
5. Experimental Manipulations of Conscious Awareness
Perhaps the strongest evidence for unconscious inﬂuences on judgment is that
participants who are made more aware of such inﬂuences correct for them. These 
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effects have been demonstrated in research on the effects of primed trait words
on the impressions formed of target persons. For example, presenting words
related to the trait “reckless” in the context of an unrelated task (e.g., unscrambling
sentences) leads participants to assimilate to the primes in the impressions they
form of others (e.g., individuals evaluate the target person’s actions as more
reckless; Higgins et al., 1977; see also Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). However,
priming effects of this sort are eliminated and even reversed when participants are
made more aware of the potentially biasing inﬂuence of the primes. For example,
individuals who cannot remember the words with which they had been previously
primed fall prey to the typical assimilation effect. Conversely, individuals who can
consciously recall the primes demonstrate contrast effects—rendering judgments
 
opposite
 
 to those the primes would ordinarily lead them to make (for example,
judging a target person to be 
 
less
 
 stubborn after being primed with words related
to stubbornness; Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987; see also Newman & Uleman,
1990).
Similar effects are found when awareness is experimentally increased. For
example, individuals subtly reminded of the priming episode just prior to reading
about the target person (for example, by asking them whether the priming task
was easy or difﬁcult) also demonstrate a contrast effect, correcting away from the
inﬂuence of the prime. Participants who are not given such a reminder demonstrate
assimilation (Erb, Bioy, & Hilton, 2002; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kübler, & Wänke,
1993). Blatantly priming participants with trait-related words prior to the impression
formation task (as opposed to more subtle manipulations, such as embedding the
words in a supposedly unrelated task), likewise produces contrast effects (Newman
& Uleman, 1990; see also Moskowitz & Roman, 1992).
Moreover, such contrast effects appear to depend on participants’ capacity for
deliberative processing. Moskowitz and Skurnick (1999) primed participants with
words related to the trait “hostile” using word puzzles. Again, being reminded of
the primes led to a contrast effect in judgments of the target person, such that
they were actually deemed less hostile after hostility had been primed. However,
this contrast effect was eliminated in a condition in which participants were placed
under cognitive load via the distracting task of keeping the titles of academic
articles in memory (see Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990, for a similar ﬁnding).
This indicates that assimilation to primes is unconscious by showing that
increased awareness of being primed makes the assimilation effect disappear (and
is replaced by a contrast effect). That even minimal increases in participants’
degree of conscious awareness of being primed decreases the inﬂuence of primes
on social judgments strongly argues that that inﬂuence is unconscious—even if
the degree of awareness participants require in order to make their corrections is
not perfect.
Again, one of the strengths of this methodology is that it does not require
accepting the null to conclude a lack of conscious awareness. Rather, it utilizes
the presence of an effect (a contrast effect with increased awareness) to show that 
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another effect (assimilation to unobtrusively presented prime words) is unconscious.
Another notable strength of this methodology is that, because it does not depend
on participants’ recollections of having been inﬂuenced, it does not risk confusing
forgetfulness with unconsciousness. One is therefore on safe ground making the
strong claim that unobtrusively primed concepts unconsciously inﬂuence judgments
and behaviors.
Summary
People are clearly often unconscious of the inﬂuences on their judgments. Participant
debrieﬁngs and subliminal priming studies, which tend to equate unconsciousness
with the null hypothesis, together provide signiﬁcant, but not conclusive, evidence
for unconscious inﬂuences. Conclusive evidence of inﬂuence unconsciousness
comes from studies that compare the judgments of actors and observers, ask
participants to analyze the reasons for their attitudes, and manipulate conscious
awareness of primed concepts. It appears a fundamental aspect of social cognition
that we lack introspective access into many inﬂuences on our feelings, judgments,
and behaviors.
 
STATE UNCONSCIOUSNESS I: ARE PEOPLE AWARE OF THE MENTAL STATES THAT 
MEDIATE INFLUENCES ON THEIR BEHAVIOR?
 
There are two different versions of the proposal that people are unconscious of
the mental states that give rise to their judgments and behaviors. We will discuss
here work suggesting that environments prime behavior without any awareness of
intervening mental states, then turn to research suggesting that implicit measures
reveal attitudes that are unconscious.
The possibility that the environment can prime behavior with no awareness of
intervening mental states is raised by studies in which unobtrusively primed concepts
led to dramatic changes in social judgments and behaviors (Bargh & Ferguson,
2000; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Chen,
Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong,
& Dunn, 1998; Van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, De Bouter, & Van Knippenberg,
2003). For example, Bargh et al. (1996) found that priming words related to
politeness (using an ostensibly unrelated sentence-unscrambling task) led participants
to wait longer before interrupting the experimenter. Taken together, debrieﬁngs
and the effects of blatant versus subtle priming conclusively demonstrate that
participants are not aware of the inﬂuence of the primes. But at the same time,
testing to see whether a person is unconscious of the inﬂuence of the primes is
different from testing to see whether they are unconscious of the internal states
that mediate the effects of the priming. For instance, a person might be unaware 
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that exposure to words related to competitiveness has caused her to behave
competitively, but still be aware that she is feeling particularly competitive at the
moment.
Unobtrusive Priming can Inﬂuence Conscious States
Indeed, recent studies indicate that unobtrusive priming can inﬂuence conscious
mental states (e.g., Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990; DeMarree, Wheeler, & Petty,
2005; Kawakami, Dovidio, & Dijksterhuis, 2003; Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, & Ross,
2004; Kay & Ross, 2003; Levesque & Pelletier, 2003; McCoy and Major, in press;
Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004; Nelson & Norton, 2005; Shah & Kruglanski,
2002, 2003; Shah, 2003a/b; Stapel & Blanton, 2004; Tamir, Robinson, Clore,
Martin, & Whitaker, 2004; Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005). In relevant
investigations, participants primed with words related to autonomy reported
greater intrinsic motivation (Levesque & Pelletier, 2003), subliminal exposure to
happy and sad faces inﬂuenced the consciously perceived value of a fruit ﬂavored
drink as well as the amount of the drink participants intended to consume
(Winkielman et al., 2005), being subliminally primed with the scowling face of
department head Bob Zajonc led graduate students to explicitly evaluate their
own research ideas more negatively (Baldwin et al., 1990), Catholic women who
read a sexually explicit passage and were subliminally primed with the face of the
Pope consciously perceived themselves as worse Catholics (Baldwin et al., 1990),
priming the concept “superhero” increased college students’ explicit willingness
to help others in hypothetical situations (Nelson & Norton, 2005), individuals
engaged in a competitive game consciously perceived their performance more
positively when subliminally primed with smiling faces (Tamir et al., 2004), primes
related to business environments led participants to perceive competitiveness as
more situationally appropriate (Kay et al., 2004), participants primed with words
related to cooperativeness were more likely to report the intention to cooperate
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation (Kay & Ross, 2003), and unobtrusively priming
words related to merit increased the extent to which participants consciously
endorsed meritocracy (McCoy & Major, in press).
Other work has examined the effects of being primed with members of
stereotyped groups on personal attitudes. In three experiments, Kawakami et al.
(2003) found that subliminally or otherwise unobtrusively priming college students
with elderly persons led them to report more positive attitudes towards publicly
funded health care and more negative views of nudity on television. In a fourth
experiment, students primed with skinheads reported more negative attitudes
towards immigrants and racial minorities.
At the same time, however, there are also studies in which primed concepts did
not inﬂuence a particular self-reported state (e.g., Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin,
2004; Bargh et al., 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; 
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Shah & Kruglanski, 2002, 2003; Winkielman et al., 2005). For instance, priming
words related to cooperativeness did not inﬂuence self-reported commitment to
the goal of behaving cooperatively (Bargh et al., 2001), priming words related to
memorizing had no effect on self-reported memorization goals (Chartrand &
Bargh, 1996), subliminally priming people with the name of their best friend had
no effect on their motivation to be understanding about another person’s behavior
(Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003), subliminally priming a goal relevant to an alternative
task had no effect on the perceived difﬁculty of a current task (although it did
inﬂuence self-reports of thinking about and feeling distracted by the alternative
goal; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002, 2003), and subliminally presenting happy and sad
faces did not inﬂuence participants’ conscious mood (although effects were found
on conscious desire to consume a beverage as well as the consciously perceived
value of the beverage; Winkielman et al., 2005). However,  that primes have
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced conscious states in a sizeable number of investigations at
least raises the possibility that conscious states can mediate priming effects on
behavior.
Changes in Conscious States can Mediate Priming Effects
Additional work ﬁnds evidence that changes in conscious states can mediate
prime-to-behavior effects (Chartrand, van Baaren, & Bargh, 2006; Hertel & Kerr,
2001; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002, 2003; Shah, 2003a/b; Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna,
2002). For example, Shah (2003b) found that subliminally priming participants
with the names of signiﬁcant people in their life inﬂuenced the expected difﬁculty
and perceived importance of an anagram task, and that these conscious states
statistically mediated (Baron & Kenny, 1986) the effects of the primes on behavior.
Chartrand et al. (2006) found that consciously reported mood signiﬁcantly
mediated the effects of subliminal affect primes on stereotypic judgments. In other
relevant work, priming an alternative goal increased conscious thoughts about
the alternative goal, negatively impacted performance at a current task, and
self-reports of feeling distracted by the alternative goal mediated the effect of the
primes on performance (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002, 2003).
Also, Strahan et al. (2002) found that subliminally priming the word “thirst”
increased the inﬂuence of an advertisement on both self-reported attitudes and
taking coupons for the advertised sports drink. Moreover, it seems likely that
changes in conscious attitudes towards the sports drinks at least partly mediated
the effects of the priming manipulation on behavior, given that the self-report
attitude measure and behavioral measure of taking coupons were highly correlated
(
 
r
 
 = .71). Hertel and Kerr (2001) report that priming the concept “loyalty” using
an ostensible verbal memory task led to the conscious perception that loyalty was
expected of group members, greater self-reported ingroup identiﬁcation, and
behavior favoring the ingroup (allocating more resources to ingroup members 
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than to outgroup members). In addition, the consciously perceived normativeness
of group loyalty mediated the effects of the primes on behavior—controlling for
the effects of the priming manipulation on perceived norms reduced the behavioral
effect to nonsigniﬁcance.
Again, such studies are simply existence proofs that conscious states 
 
can 
 
mediate
prime-to-behavior effects, and cannot demonstrate that such effects are 
 
usually
 
mediated by conscious states. As noted earlier, other studies ﬁnd little to no
evidence that particular self-reported states mediate priming effects (e.g., Aarts
et al., 2004; Bargh et al., 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Fitzsimons & Bargh,
2003). However, the results of studies like Shah (2003b), Chartrand et al. (2006),
and Hertel and Kerr (2001) do suggest that at least some priming effects are
mediated by states of which the person is conscious.
Was the Correct State Assessed?
In our view, the most critical issue with demonstrating that unconscious states
mediate priming effects is that it is difﬁcult to ﬁgure out what the right state to
test conscious awareness of is. For example, Shah (2003b) observed effects of
priming signiﬁcant others on conscious expectations of success on an anagram
task, but no effects on a general sense of self-efﬁcacy. Similarly, Hertel and Kerr
(2001) measured both self-reported group identiﬁcation and perceived norms, but
only the latter mediated the effects of the priming manipulation.
In fact, relatively little is known about what sorts of mental states typically
mediate the effects of priming manipulations (Cesario, Plaks, & Higgins, 2006;
DeMarree et al., 2005; Wheeler & Petty, 2001). Wheeler and Petty (2001) provide
an extensive list of potential mediators, among them changes in mood, approach-
avoidance states, goals, behavioral tags, motivations, perceived norms, and self-
concept. DeMarree et al. (2005) argue that changes in the self-concept mediate
priming effects, and present some supporting evidence (see also Wheeler, DeMarree,
& Petty, 2005). Bargh et al. (2001) and Cesario et al. (2006) propose that stereotype
priming effects might be mediated by goals associated with stereotyped groups
(see Cesario et al., 2006, for some empirical evidence). Other potential mediating
states readily come to mind, for instance expectations, beliefs, abstract attitudes,
and attitudes towards the behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977).
Judging the relative accuracy of each of these theories concerning potential
mediators is critical to determining whether prime-to-behavior effects are
mediated by conscious or unconscious states. Consider for a moment the possibility
that DeMarree et al. (2005) are right, and changes in self-concept mediate many
priming effects. If so, it is difﬁcult to resolve the issue of whether people are state
conscious or not because very few studies assessed conscious self-concept. And if
Bargh et al. (2001) and Cesario et al. (2006) are correct that stereotype primes
activate goals, it is hard to tell whether such primes are mediated by a conscious 
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state because measures of self-reported goals were typically not assessed in stereotype
priming studies. This is not to argue that DeMarree et al. (2005), Bargh et al.
(2001), or Cesario et al. (2006) are necessarily correct, only that we need to know
what sorts of state mediates a priming manipulation before we are in a position
to test for conscious awareness of that state.
Criteria for the Veriﬁcation of an Unconscious State
We  propose that two steps are necessary to show that the effects of a priming
manipulation are mediated by changes in an unconscious state. First, we must
have at least a general idea of what sort of state (e.g., self-concept, mood) mediates
the particular priming manipulation in question. Otherwise, the possibility remains
open that some other conscious state mediated the effects of the priming (e.g., it was
perceived norms rather than self-concept, or attitudes rather than mood).
For the most part, this criterion has not been met. One important exception is
work showing that some priming manipulations are mediated by changes in goal
states (Bargh et al., 2001; Cesario et al., 2006). Goals are known to increase in
strength until acted on (Atkinson & Birch, 1970), and priming words like
“succeed” produces effects on behavior that are even stronger after a brief delay
(Bargh et al., 2001). People persist in pursuing their goals even in the face of
obstacles (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996), and individuals primed to succeed
continue to work on a task even when instructed to stop (Bargh et al., 2001). Such
results strongly support the hypothesis that words related to success prime a goal
to succeed on achievement-related tasks.
Second, evidence is needed that while self-reports of the relevant state do not
mediate the effects of unobtrusively presented primes, the same self-report measure
does mediate a more explicit manipulation. To give a hypothetical example, priming
people for success leads them to solve more anagrams with no noticeable change
in conscious states, but a conscious goal to be successful does mediate the effects
of explicitly instructing them to try to succeed. Since in this hypothetical example
the self-report measure performed well under theoretically expected circumstances,
it was clearly both valid and relevant for that particular situation. Because participants
were  randomly assigned to either the unobtrusive priming condition or the
explicit instruction condition, it would further be clear that the consciousness with
which the goal was adopted caused self-reported goals to mediate more effectively
in one condition than in the other.
This second criterion was ﬁrst proposed by Bargh et al. (2001), who carried out
a relevant empirical investigation. Participants took part in a commons game
that gave them the opportunity to either share resources with others or use up
communal resources for their own personal gain. After the game, participants
completed self-report measures of their commitment to behaving cooperatively
during the game. Both participants with a conscious and unobtrusively primed 
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goal to cooperate behaved more cooperatively, soaking up less communal
resources in return for personal proﬁt. While individuals with a conscious goal to
be cooperative evidenced a correlation between their self-reported commitment
to cooperativeness and their behavior in the commons game, individuals primed
with cooperation did not. This provides conclusive evidence that the effects of the
primes were mediated by an unconscious goal.
Summary
The available data indicates that priming effects are sometimes mediated by
conscious states, while null effects suggest state unconsciousness in other cases.
Verifying unconscious states is challenging due to persistent uncertainty regarding
what sorts of states mediate prime-to-behavior effects. Two criteria should be met
before concluding that a priming manipulation was mediated by an unconscious
state. First, independent evidence is needed regarding what sort of state (e.g., self-
concept, attitude, mood, goals, perceived norms) mediates the priming effect.
Second, a self-report measure of that state should be unresponsive to the priming
manipulation, yet mediate the effects of a more explicit manipulation.
 
STATE UNCONSCIOUSNESS II: ARE PEOPLE AWARE OF THEIR SOCIAL ATTITUDES?
 
One of the most thought provoking and frequently discussed hypotheses regarding
social cognition is that we are often unaware of the attitudes that give rise to our
judgments and behaviors. While some leading researchers have hypothesized that
social attitudes are often unconscious (Banaji, 2001; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995),
others have argued that they are generally conscious (Fazio & Olson, 2003;
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006;
Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007).
Gawronski, Bodenhausen, and their colleagues (Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2006; Gawronski et al., 2006, 2007) propose a useful distinction between the
automatic activation of evaluative associations in memory (e.g., automatic
evaluations) and propositional processes concerned with whether the association
is valid (e.g., explicit evaluations). For instance, seeing an African American person
activates concepts related to violence, after which the social perceiver consciously
decides whether or not the association is accurate. Gawronski (2007) further argue
that while evaluative associations are automatically activated, they are nonetheless
available to conscious introspection.
Several considerations make it difﬁcult to conclusively demonstrate that an
attitude is unconscious. It is important to again distinguish between being
unconscious of the factors that inﬂuence a mental state versus being unconscious
of the state itself (see also Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski et al., 2006, 2007). For 
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example, mere exposure studies demonstrate that subliminal exposure to a stimulus
increases subsequent liking of the stimulus (Zajonc, 1980). However, the resulting
attitude is an unconscious effect of the subliminal exposure, not an unconscious
attitude—indeed, since the dependent variable in mere exposure research is self-
reported liking, the attitude is by deﬁnition consciously accessible. Similarly, one can
be consciously aware of one’s attitude, yet be completely unaware that it was created
by an unobtrusive classical conditioning procedure (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2001).
It is also important to distinguish between unconsciousness of an attitude versus
unconsciousness that the attitude is being assessed (see also Fazio & Olson, 2003;
Gawronski et al., 2007). Reaction time measures like evaluative priming (Dovidio,
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, &
Williams, 1995) and the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998) use response latencies when representatives of a social group
(e.g., “Republicans”) are paired with evaluative words (e.g., “Bad”) to assess social
attitudes. But neither the IAT nor evaluative priming demonstrates that the
association being assessed is unconscious in nature—only that the participant
cannot consciously control her responses to the stimuli.
Correlations between Different Measures of Attitude
Considerable research compares responses on implicit and explicit measures of
attitude. In this work, attitudes are measured either directly using explicit self-
report questionnaires, or indirectly (i.e., implicitly) through reaction time. In many
cases, researchers ﬁnd that implicit and explicit measures of attitude are either
weakly correlated or uncorrelated with one another (Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio
et al., 1995; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Greenwald et al., 1998).
 However, dissociations between implicit and explicit measures cannot be used
to conclude independent unconscious and conscious systems (Roediger, 1990;
Schacter, 1992). The reason is that dissociations are not only common between
implicit and explicit measures, but also between different implicit measures (for
examples from the attitude literature, see Boniecki & Jacks, 2002; Bosson, Swann,
& Pennebaker, 2000; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Nosek & Hansen, 2006; Rudman,
Ashmore, & Gary, 2001).
These dissociations often occur due to meaningful differences between implicit
measures. For example, priming measures assess the average evaluative response
to a series of 
 
individual
 
  African American faces, whereas IAT measures assess
evaluations of the 
 
category
 
 “African Americans” (De Houwer, 2001; Olson & Fazio,
2003). But dissociations between priming and IAT measures are observed even
when both assess attitudes towards categories (Boniecki & Jacks, 2002; Bosson et al.,
2000; Nosek & Hansen, 2006; Rudman et al., 2001). Thus, low or null correlations
between different implicit measures probably also occur for methodological
reasons. Indeed, as research using multi-method, multi-trait matrices has shown, 
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measures often cluster together based on method variance rather than the construct
they are ostensibly tapping (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Cook & Selltiz, 1964; Cote
& Buckley, 1987). This raises the possibility that dissociations between different
implicit measures, as well as between implicit and explicit measures, result to a
considerable extent from random and systematic measurement error.
With regard to random error, implicit measures are less statistically reliable
than explicit measures (Bosson et al., 2000; Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji,
2001; Gawronski et al., 2007; Nosek & Hansen, 2006; Olson & Fazio, 2003). For
example, a recent meta-analysis indicates that the average correlation between
priming and questionnaire measures of racial attitudes is only .16 (average 
 
r
 
 = .24
collapsing across all implicit measures; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001). But
consider that the reliability of standard priming measures averages about .30
across studies (see Bosson et al., 2000; Cunningham et al., 2001; Kawakami &
Dovidio, 2001; Nosek & Hansen, 2006; Olson & Fazio, 2003). Such high degrees
of measurement error constitute a leveling bias that may mask the true relationship
between implicit and explicit measures.
Consistent with this idea, use of latent variable analysis to correct for measurement
error increases the correlation between evaluative priming and IAT measures and
self-reported racial attitudes from below .20 to .45 (the correlation between the
IAT and evaluative priming measures also rises dramatically; Cunningham et al.,
2001). Similarly, correcting for measurement error raises the correlations between
IAT and questionnaire measures of attitudes towards African Americans vs.
European Americans, the rich vs. the poor, gay vs. straight men, Americans vs.
foreigners, and Christians vs. Jews to .47 (Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004).
Notably, the average implicit-explicit correspondence for racial attitudes revealed
by  meta-analysis (
 
r
 
  = .24; Dovidio et al., 2001) is close to the uncorrected
correlations found by Cunningham et al. (2001, 2004).
Recent work by Payne and his colleagues illustrates the role of systematic
measurement error in the correspondence between implicit and explicit measures.
Their work employed the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng,
Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), a task in which Black and White faces are brieﬂy
ﬂashed just before participants evaluate ambiguous pictographs. White Americans
tend to evaluate the ambiguous pictographs more negatively when a Black face
has just been ﬂashed, a pattern of responses reﬂective of automatic prejudice. The
correlations between AMP scores and self-reported racial attitudes are systematically
higher when the implicit and explicit tasks are equated on irrelevant methodological
variables (Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008). When carefully matched, correlations
upwards of .60 are observed, even without correcting for random error.
Social desirability pressures further attenuate the relationship between implicit
and explicit measures of attitude. Many attitude domains judged by independent
raters to be low in social desirability pressures (e.g., political, academic, and
consumer attitudes) are marked by correlations between IAT and explicit measures
that approach or exceed .50 even without correcting for measurement error 
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(Brunel, Tietje, & Greenwald, 2004; Karpinski, Steinman, & Hilton, 2005; Maison,
Greenwald, & Bruin, 2001; Nosek, 2005; Nosek & Banaji, 2002; Nosek, Banaji,
& Greenwald, 2002; Swanson, Rudman, & Greenwald, 2001; although see Hofman,
Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). (Implicit and self-report measures
do exhibit low correlations in many non-sensitive domains, such as attitudes
towards ﬂowers vs. insects; Greenwald et al., 1998; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).
Assessed at the level of individual differences, a general concern about providing
socially desirable responses similarly attenuates the relationship between priming
and explicit measures of prejudice against African Americans (Dunton & Fazio,
1997; Fazio et al., 1995; Payne, 2001; see also Payne et al., 2005) and IAT and
self-report measures of attitudes towards gay men (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001).
The moderating role of social desirability pressures is somewhat difﬁcult to
interpret because the attitudes people are motivated to hide from others they may
even be loathe to admit to themselves. In other words, implicit and explicit
measures of prejudice may correlate less highly than similar measures of political
attitudes because the implicit measure is tapping into an attitude which the
individual consciously denies to herself. There is, however, some evidence that the
more speciﬁc motivation to hide one’s prejudices from 
 
other people
 
 reduces implicit-
explicit correspondence. Whereas individuals who report motivation to respond
without prejudice speciﬁcally to avoid social censure show no relationship between
IAT and self-report measures of attitudes towards gay men, individuals who
report feeling little pressure to lie show substantial implicit-explicit correspondence
(Lemm, 2000). In an experimental study, when participants were asked to be
completely honest in their explicit responses, the correlation between a self-report
and IAT measure of self-esteem increased signiﬁcantly (Olson, Fazio, & Hermann,
in press). These ﬁndings indicate that 1) motivations to provide socially desirable
responses on questionnaires attenuate the relationship between implicit and
explicit measures and 2) this at least partly results from an effort to deceive others
about one’s attitude.
Awareness of Automatic Attitudes
In some cases, an individual likely does have two distinct attitudes, one tapped
by  explicit measures, the other by an implicit measure such as the IAT (see
Kihlstrom, 2004; Wilson, 2002; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). While we
have noted the difﬁculty of concluding a dissociation based on low correlations,
scores on implicit and explicit measures can also show mean differences, such as
when White Americans show a more consistent preference for Whites over Blacks
on the IAT than on self-report measures (Greenwald et al., 1998). Such 
 
mean
dissociations
 
  (Nosek, 2002, 2005) can be so dramatic that they are difﬁcult to
attribute entirely to social desirability concerns. However, even when a person
does hold dual attitudes (Wilson, 2002; Wilson et al., 2000), it does not necessarily 
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follow that her second attitude is unconscious. She may be aware of her second
attitude but not report it because she does not perceive it as reﬂecting her true
self. For example, she may be consciously aware of her unwanted automatic
prejudices towards racial minorities, but express her more personally endorsed,
egalitarian views when asked for her attitude.
In fact, there is some evidence that White Americans are aware of their automatic
prejudices. While White students tend to explicitly reject prejudiced ideas and
beliefs about minorities, about 75% agree to questionnaire items like: “Although
I don’t necessarily want to, I sometimes have prejudiced reactions (like spontaneous
thoughts and gut feelings) towards racial minorities that I’m not sure I can prevent”
(Uhlmann & Nosek, 2005). In addition, respondents correctly estimate that their
ﬁrst, gut response to an African American person will be more prejudiced than
their later responses (Voils & Monteith, 2004). Moreover, individuals who report
discrepancies between how they should and would act towards African Americans
(e.g., I 
 
should 
 
vs. 
 
would
 
 think stereotypical thoughts) demonstrate more prejudiced
behaviors, but only under cognitive load—suggesting that people can also be
aware of their automatic prejudiced behaviors (Monteith & Voils, 1998).
Additional suggestive evidence for awareness of automatic attitudes comes from
work showing that implicit and explicit measures interact to predict judgments
and behaviors. These interactions suggest that people not only compensate, but
in some cases even 
 
overcompensate
 
 for their automatic attitudes. For example,
individuals who are automatically prejudiced but who are consciously motivated
to respond without prejudice respond even more favorably towards Black targets
in terms of their trait judgments (Olson & Fazio, 2004) and willingness to interact
with the person (Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2003) than individuals who are not
automatically prejudiced (see also Dasgupta, 2004). As noted earlier, increased
awareness of an automatic process can lead to correction effects (Newman &
Uleman, 1990; Moskowitz & Roman, 1992).
In addition—and consistent with theories positing that narcissism and defensive-
ness stem from effortful attempts to compensate for negative automatic views of
the self—individuals high in self-reported self-esteem but low in automatic self-
esteem are more narcissistic and defensive (for example, rationalizing their behaviors
more; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003; McGregor &
Marigold, 2003). Because in order to make such corrections, people likely possess
at  least some ﬂeeting awareness of the attitude (Wilson & Brekke, 1994), this
research further supports the hypothesis that people can be aware of automatic
attitudes that conﬂict with their intentionally endorsed views.
 
1
 
Alternative Criteria for Concluding Unconsciousness vs. Consciousness of Attitudes
What alternative criteria might be used to verify that an implicit measure is
tapping into an unconscious attitude? We suggest that a good criterion would 
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draw upon multiple correlated implicit measures. As noted earlier, implicit measures
generally do not correlate with each other, making it difﬁcult to interpret low
implicit-explicit correlations. Multiple correlated implicit measures are necessary
to reduce the possibility that low implicit-explicit correlations are due to method-
ological variables like random and systematic measurement error. When different
implicit measures show convergent validity (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2001; Olson
& Fazio, 2003), we can have more conﬁdence that their failure to correspond with
explicit measures reﬂects dissociated attitudes.
Also, self-perceived automatic attitudes should be measured in addition to
intentionally endorsed attitudes. Some evidence suggests that people can be aware
of their unwanted automatic attitudes. It is therefore necessary to compare
responses on implicit measures to people’s beliefs about their automatic attitudes,
not just evaluations that they intentionally endorse.
We  suggest that there are two types of dissociations between implicit and
explicit measures that can be used to verify an unconscious state. First, automatic
and self-reported attitudes may be 
 
uncorrelated at an individual differences level
 
. In other
words, those individuals who report positive evaluations of the attitude object are
not the same individuals who have positive automatic associations with the attitude
object. When multiple correlated implicit measures fail to correspond with self-
report measures of the same construct, both intentionally endorsed and self-
perceived automatic attitudes are assessed, and a correction for measurement
error is made, null implicit-explicit correlations become much more diagnostic of
unconscious attitudes.
Second, participants may exhibit 
 
self-reported and automatic evaluations that are
opposed in valence
 
. In other words, people prefer attitude object A over attitude
object B on self-report measures, yet exhibit more positive automatic associations
with attitude object B than with attitude object A. Even in cases in which implicit
and explicit measures of attitude are highly correlated at an individual differences
level, very different mean preferences suggest a conscious-unconscious dissociation.
Conversely, if implicit measures are tapping into an attitude of which the person
is conscious, implicit and self-report measures should correlate highly at an individual
differences level and further reveal about the same mean preference. The self-
report measure could be of either intentionally endorsed attitudes or self-perceived
automatic attitudes. Below we illustrate how these criteria apply to recent empirical
ﬁndings.
Applying the Criteria
On average, people exhibit a preference for ﬂowers over insects on both self-
report measures of attitude and on the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al.,
1998; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). But at the same time, self-reported attitudes
and automatic associations are virtually uncorrelated at an individual differences 
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level. This appears to be a case of implicit-explicit correspondence in terms of
mean preferences, along with an implicit-explicit dissociation at an individual
differences level. This pattern of results suggests that people are not aware of their
automatic associations. If they were aware, the people who self-reported the
strongest preferences for ﬂowers over insects should have exhibited the most positive
associations with ﬂowers relative to insects. Note, however, that this conclusion
would be considerably stronger if more than one implicit measure had been used
and self-perceived automatic attitudes assessed.
Also, while self-report and IAT measures of attitudes towards evolutionary
theory vs. creationism are highly correlated at an individual-differences level (
 
r
 
 = .60),
people actually exhibit 
 
opposite
 
  preferences on self-report and IAT measures
(Nosek, 2002, 2005). Speciﬁcally, while participants on average self-report a
preference for evolutionary theory, on the IAT they exhibit a preference for
creationism. While this pattern of results would again be more conclusive if more
implicit measures were used and self-perceived automatic attitudes assessed, it
does suggest a lack of awareness of the automatic attitude. Even when implicit
and explicit measures are highly correlated across individuals, if people exhibit
opposite preferences on implicit vs. explicit measures there are probably unconscious
attitudes at work.
We now turn to a few ﬁndings that suggest awareness of the evaluative associations
assessed by implicit measures. The ﬁrst notable study compared participant’s self-
perceived automatic attitudes towards gay people with their scores on implicit
measures of automatic associations (Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, in press; see
also Smith & Nosek, 2005). Participants reported both their “gut feelings” and
deliberatively endorsed feelings towards gay people. Participants’ self-reported gut
feelings (i.e., self-perceived automatic attitudes) toward gay people were signiﬁcantly
more negative than their deliberatively endorsed feelings. Moreover, while their
self-reported gut feelings correlated signiﬁcantly with Implicit Association Test
and Go/No-Go Association Task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001) measures of automatic
associations with gay people, their deliberatively endorsed feelings did not. These
ﬁndings indicate that people can be aware of automatic feelings that are discrepant
from their intentionally endorsed attitudes.
A ﬁnal illustrative example is that of evaluations of major political candidates
(e.g., Kerry vs. Bush). Scores on implicit and explicit measures of political attitudes
are highly correlated at an individual-difference level (.50 < 
 
r
 
s < .80). At the same
time, people express similar mean preferences on both types of measure (i.e., there
is no overall preference in either case, reﬂecting the even split between Democrats
and Republicans in U.S. society). This pattern of results has been replicated using
both the IAT (Nosek, 2005; Nosek et al., 2002) and AMP (Affective Misattribution
Paradigm) measures (Payne et al., 2005). Because implicit-explicit concordance
was present at both an individual-differences level and when examining mean
preferences, these results suggest that people are consciously aware of their
automatic political attitudes. 
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Summary
Conclusively identifying unconscious social attitudes is methodologically challenging
because implicit measurement does not guarantee that the attitude is inaccessible
to conscious awareness. Correlations between implicit and explicit measures
improve considerably once social desirability concerns and measurement error
are accounted for. Even when dissociations between implicit and explicit measures
do result from distinct attitudes, people can still be consciously aware of their
second, more automatic attitude. A more rigorous criterion for concluding state
unconsciousness is to demonstrate that multiple, correlated implicit measures fail
to correspond with self-report measures of both intentionally endorsed attitudes
and self-perceived automatic attitudes.
 
CONCLUSION
 
There are many conclusive demonstrations that we are inﬂuenced by factors that
we are unaware of, and that these have a profound effect on our feelings, judgments,
and actions. In contrast, while recent empirical ﬁndings provide signiﬁcant
evidence in favor of unconscious mental states, such states are difﬁcult to verify.
Because it is difﬁcult to conﬁrm the null hypothesis, operationalizing state
unconsciousness as the null makes it difﬁcult to conclusively demonstrate a lack
of awareness of such states.
In an effort to further this line of research, we have proposed empirical criteria
for verifying unconscious states. We recommend that two criteria be met before
concluding that a prime-to-behavior effect was mediated by an unconscious
state. First, independent evidence is needed regarding what sort of state (e.g., self-
concept, attitude, mood, goals, perceived norms) mediates the priming effect.
Second, a self-report measure of that state should be unresponsive to the priming
manipulation, yet mediate the effects of a more explicit manipulation (Bargh et al.,
2001).
With regard to social attitudes, we have proposed that unconsciousness can be
concluded if multiple, correlated implicit measures failed to correspond with self-
report measures of both intentionally endorsed attitudes and self-perceived
automatic attitudes. Such dissociations could either take the form of low individual
differences correlations (e.g., no correlation between implicit and explicit measures
of attitudes towards ﬂowers) or very different mean preferences (e.g., an on average
explicit preference for evolution over creationism, but on average an implicit
preference for creationism over evolution).
At this point, it seems important to consider the broader implications of the
conclusive evidence currently available for unconscious social cognition—that for
unconscious inﬂuences. What implications do unconscious inﬂuences hold for
theories in which behavior is the product of conscious mental processes? 
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One possibility is that conscious deliberation and unconscious inﬂuences operate
more or less independently of one another. Sometimes behavior is driven by
consciously endorsed attitudes and assessments of situational norms, each of
which in turn contributes to our conscious intention to carry out the behavior
(Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). At other times, our behavior is the
consequence of factors that exert an unconscious inﬂuence. For example,
sometimes we act competitively because we consciously desire to compete, and at
other times because we have been nonconsciously primed to compete by stimuli
in the environment.
It seems likely, however, that conscious and unconscious cognition are related
in interesting ways (Bargh et al., 2001; Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Wilson, 2002).
Our environments may unconsciously inﬂuence us by activating dispositions
that we consciously endorse. For example, a student may have competition goals
automatically activated in school situations because she has habitually competed
with other students in the past (Bargh et al., 2001). This automatic activation may
reﬂect the gradual habitualization of her consciously chosen goal to compete in
academic situations. As a result, she may be aware of currently feeling competitive
(i.e., she is state conscious), without knowing the reason why (i.e., she is unconscious
of the inﬂuence of the immediate situation).
There is another way in which both unconscious inﬂuences and conscious
processes may be in effect much of the time. That is, consistent with the theories
of reasoned action and planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975),
our behaviors are proximally caused by conscious attitudes, perceived norms, and
intentions—but these conscious states are themselves determined by distal factors
we are not always conscious of. For instance, a man might be aware that he is
voting for a candidate because he personally likes the candidate and his friends
support the candidate, yet remain unaware that the candidate’s height is exerting
an inﬂuence on his preference. This idea ﬁnds support in research on the limited
introspective access people have into the causes of their conscious attitudes
(Wilson & LaFleur, 1995; Wilson et al., 1984; see also Haidt, 2001).
In the end, there may be surprisingly little discrepancy between unconscious
inﬂuences and theories in which conscious states play a central role in human
action. Self-reported intentions, attitudes toward the behavior and perceived
social norms are powerful predictors of behaviors ranging from driving violations
and smoking marijuana to using birth control pills, having an abortion, organ
donation, occupational choices, and voting (for meta-analytic reviews, see Armitage
& Conner, 2001; Randall & Wolff, 1994; Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988).
But all of this is fully consistent with the idea that conscious attitudes, beliefs and
intentions 1) can become automatized (and once automatic can become difﬁcult
to control) and 2) are themselves subject to unconscious inﬂuences.
To summarize, we have distinguished between two important types of unconscious
social cognition: unconsciousness of the inﬂuences on judgments and actions,
and unconscious of the mental states that give rise to judgments and actions. 
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Unconscious inﬂuences are corroborated by conclusive evidence from a variety of
experimental paradigms. While there is some signiﬁcant evidence of unconscious
states, such states are more difﬁcult to verify. We have proposed new criteria
aimed at providing conclusive evidence of state unconsciousness. We have further
argued that unconscious inﬂuences on feelings, judgments and actions are in
many respects compatible with theories in which conscious states are important
causes of behavior.
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NOTE
 
1
 
As yet unanswered questions include potential individual and cultural differences in
the ability to accurately introspect about one’s mental states. While speculative, it seems
possible that individuals who score low on self-deception (Paulhus, 1984) and high in need
for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) are more effective at introspecting.
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